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Courts are grappling with the question whether forced decryption of 
computer files violates the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination. This Article supplies the background necessary for courts 
to address this question. It explains how full disk encryption works and 
discusses the nature of encryption technology from a semantic and 
information-theory perspective. It also compares how similar questions 
have been addressed in other areas of the law that have dealt with 
computer code as speech: the First Amendment and copyright law. This
Article argues that disclosure of a password or encryption key is not a 
testimonial act and therefore is not privileged under the Fifth 
Amendment.
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INTRODUCTION
User-controlled encryption is cheap, easy, and ubiquitous. This is 
good, because encryption provides invaluable benefits for commerce and 
personal freedom. Without encryption, the Internet and other modern 
communications networks would lose much of their valuable 
functionality. But encryption is also a significant problem, because it 
enables criminals to hide evidence.1 Contrary to television shows such as 
“CSI” or “24,” forensic investigators cannot crack most off-the-shelf 
encryption.2 Many criminals hide skeletons in their hard drives, protected 
by encryption that can only be unlocked with a skeleton key they alone 
hold.
Common user-controlled encryption tools are enabled using 
passwords, biometric identifiers (such as fingerprints), and encryption 
keys.3 Courts have just begun to grapple with the question whether the 
Fifth Amendment protects against the compelled disclosure of these 
items.4 Most courts so far have agreed that disclosure of a password or 
decryption key is a testimonial act.5 However, with some notable 
exceptions, most courts have also agreed that the “foregone conclusion” 
doctrine can justify compelled disclosure.6
To address this question, courts must obtain a clear understanding of 
how encryption works, and, in particular, must understand common 
forms of “full disk encryption.” Courts should also consider the 
philosophical or normative question of what encryption is and what it 
does in relation to computer code. Only with this kind of background can 
courts decide whether disclosure of a password or encryption key is 
“testimony” or whether the foregone conclusion doctrine can apply.
This Article supplies that necessary background and argues that, under 
a proper application of Fifth Amendment doctrine, compelled decryption 
ordinarily is not a testimonial act and therefore is not privileged. Part I of 
this Article supplies a background in encryption technology. Part II 
summarizes recent Fifth Amendment cases concerning compelled 
decryption. Part III looks at encryption and computer code from a
semiotics and information theory perspective and examines how 
computer code is treated under First Amendment and copyright law for 
                                                                                                                     
1. For a discussion of some of these tensions, see David W. Opderbeck, Encryption Policy 
and Law Enforcement in the Cloud, 49 CONN. L. REV. 1657, 1662–63 (2017).
2. See infra Section I.B.
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possible analogies to the Fifth Amendment context. Part IV presents this 
Article’s doctrinal arguments under the Fifth Amendment.
I. UNDERSTANDING ENCRYPTION
A. Encryption Algorithms and Keys
Encryption is the application of an algorithm to readable information 
(plaintext) to render the information unintelligible (ciphertext).7
Decryption is the application of a “key” derived from the encryption 
algorithm to render the information intelligible once again.8
An ancient and simple encryption scheme, the “Caesar Cipher,” 
demonstrates how this process works.9 The Caesar Cipher involves 
shifting the letters of the alphabet a set number of positions.10 A “ROT13” 
Caesar cipher, for example, rotates the English alphabet 13 places to the 
right, making the encryption “key” 13.11 Thus, using the ROT13 cipher, 
the text “cynl vg ntnva fnz” means “play it again sam” because the letter 
“r” is 13 places in the alphabet from the letter “e,” and so on. This is an 
example of “symmetric key” encryption, because the same key is used to 
encrypt and decrypt the data.12 In asymmetric or “public key” encryption, 
there are two related keys: a “public” key and a “private” key.13
The ROT13 cipher is simple to use because, with twenty-six letters in 
the Latin alphabet, each letter is the inverse of the letter that is thirteen 
places away. This simplicity also makes ROT13 easy to crack.14 Many 
contemporary forms of computer encryption, however, are essentially 
impossible to crack, even with the help of large-scale computer power. 
For example, the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) approved by the 
U.S. National Institutes of Standards and Technology (NIST) for use with 
top secret information, applies 128-bit encryption with 128, 192, or 256 
                                                                                                                     
7. See U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., NIST Special 
Publication 800-57, RECOMMENDATION FOR KEY MANAGEMENT – PART 1: GENERAL REVISION 3
(July 2012) (defining “ciphertext” and “plaintext”); Eric A. Hibbard, Encryption: The Basics, in
DATA BREACH AND ENCRYPTION HANDBOOK 177, 178 (Lucy Thomson ed., A.B.A. 2011); DAVID 
SALOMON, DATA PRIVACY AND SECURITY: ENCRYPTION AND INFORMATION HIDING 7 (2003)
(noting that “[e]ncrypting a message involves two ingredients, an algorithm and a key”).
8. SALOMON, supra note 7, at 7.
9. Id. The Caesar Cipher is so named because Julius Caesar used it.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 8.
12. NIST Special Publication 800-57, supra note 7, at 28 (defining “Symmetric-key 
algorithm”).
13. Id. at 26 (defining “[p]ublic-key (asymmetric) cryptographic algorithm”). 
14. For a discussion of the ubiquitous use of ROT13 on the early Usenet as a form of insider 
humor, see the Wikipedia entry for “ROT13.” See What Is ROT13?, IND. U., https://kb.iu.edu/d/
aeol (last visited May 4, 2018). 
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bit decryption keys and is practically unbreakable with existing computer 
power.15
B. Full Disk Encryption
It is easy to copy or “image” the contents of a computer’s hard drive 
or a smart phone’s memory. Every state has at least one computer 
forensics lab capable of producing an exact copy of a hard drive, and 
regional labs coordinate among multiple states and the federal 
government.16 Courts routinely issue search warrants for the seizure of 
personal computers, laptops, and hard drives based on probable cause that 
the devices contain contraband (such as child pornography files) or other 
evidence of criminal activity (such as spreadsheets or other documents 
detailing financial crimes).17 The investigation of “computer crime” is 
now a mainstream law enforcement activity. 
Despite the sophistication of law enforcement, however, these 
forensic laboratories cannot crack robust disk encryption. The use of full 
disk encryption (FDE), through which the entire contents of a hard drive 
are encrypted, can render the drive completely opaque to law 
enforcement. In popular computer lingo, the drive becomes a “brick.”18
A proper understanding of FDE requires some background in personal 
computer architecture. Common desktop and laptop computers are 
comprised of a set of basic components, including hardware, operating 
system (OS) software, and application software.19 The hardware 
                                                                                                                     
15. See NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., FEDERAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS PROCESSING 
STANDARD 197: ANNOUNCING THE ADVANCED ENCRYPTION STANDARD (AES) (Nov. 26, 2001), 
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips197/fips-197.pdf; ADVANCED ENCRYPTION STANDARD 
(AES), CNSS POLICY NO. 15, FACT SHEET NO. 1, 2 (June 2003), https://csrc.nist.gov/csrc/
media/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program/documents/cnss15fs.pdf (stating that 
“the design and strength of all key lengths of the AES algorithm (i.e., 128, 192 and 256) are 
sufficient to protect classified information up to the SECRET level. TOP SECRET information 
will require use of either the 192 or 256 key lengths”); New Attack on AES, SCHNEIER ON SECURITY
(July 1, 2009, 11:49 AM), https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2009/07/new_attack_
on_a.html (noting that a recently published possible method of attacking AES remains “far, far 
beyond our capabilities of computation”).
16. See, e.g., NEW JERSEY REGIONAL COMPUTER FORENSICS LAB, http://www.njrcfl.org/
(last visited June 9, 2014).
17. See generally OFFICE OF LEGAL EDUCATION, EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR UNITED STATES 
ATTORNEYS, SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS AND OBTAINING EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL 
INVESTIGATIONS 61–63, https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-ccips/legacy/2015/
01/14/ssmanual2009.pdf.
18. See Bricked, URBAN DICTIONARY, http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term
=bricked (last visited Apr. 8, 2018).
19. See generally IAN WEINAND, COMPUTER ARCHITECTURE FOR BEGINNERS 35 (2016),
http://bottomupcs.sourceforge.net/csbu/c1453.html (explaining the functions of a central 
processing unit); id. at 62 (explaining the role of the operation system); Basic Computer 
4
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components include a motherboard with the microprocessor and random 
access memory (RAM), input and output devices (such as a keyboard, 
mouse, and monitor), and long term memory, which typically consists of 
one or more magnetic hard drives. Application software may include 
word processors (such as Microsoft Word), spreadsheets (such as 
Microsoft Excel), presentation tools (such as Microsoft PowerPoint), and 
a wide variety of other programs that accept user input and produce 
related content.20 The computer user employs application programs to 
produce user-generated content, such as word-processing documents.21
The OS, in a sense, sits “between” the computer’s hardware and 
application software layers.22 The OS coordinates the operations of the 
computer’s various hardware components and allows those components 
and the application software to “talk” with each other. A computer’s OS 
usually resides on the computer’s primary hard drive.23 Before the OS is 
accessed, the hard drive must boot up, which requires some degree of 
coordination among the computer’s hardware components before the OS 
begins to play its coordinating function.24 This pre-OS coordinating 
function is performed by software routines that are hard-coded on chips 
on the motherboard.25 For IBM-compatible PCs (the kind of machine that 
runs Microsoft Windows as an OS), these routines are called the BIOS 
(Basic Input/Output System).26 When a new primary hard drive is added 
to a PC, the drive is “formatted” by the system to incorporate a “pre-boot” 
sector containing BIOS code.27 After the drive is formatted, whenever the 
computer is powered up, the BIOS code on the motherboard interacts 
with the BIOS code on the hard drive and then the OS is accessed.28 A
highly stylized representation of these relationships is as follows:
                                                                                                                     
Architecture, in COMPUTER SCIENCE EDUCATION PROJECT, https://www.phy.ornl.gov/csep/ca/
node2.html#SECTION00020000000000000000 (last visited Mar. 12, 2018) (explaining the basic 
computer components). 
20. Basic Computer Architecture, supra note 19.
21. See generally DAN GOOKIN, PCS FOR DUMMIES (John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 12th ed. 2005)
(describing the general uses and applications of computers).
22. See MIROSLAW MALEK, COMPUTER SCI. ENGINEERING, OPERATING SYSTEM 2, 
https://www.eolss.net/sample-chapters/C15/E6-45-03-01.pdf, (last visited May 4, 2018). 
23. See Boot Device, COMPUTER HOPE, https://www.computerhope.com/jargon/b/
bootdevi.htm (last updated Dec. 20, 2017).
24. Id.
25. See Hard Drive, COMPUTER HOPE, https://www.computerhope.com/jargon/h/
harddriv.htm (last updated Apr. 1, 2018).
26. See id.
27. See Pre-boot Authentication, SECUDE, https://web.archive.org/web/20120304234645/
http://www.secude.com/media-room/white-papers/full-disk-encryption/pre-boot-authentication/
(last visited May 4, 2018).
28. Id.
5
Opderbeck: The Skeleton in the Hard Drive: Encryption and the Fifth Amendmen
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository,
888 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70
Basic computer disk encryption involves applying an encryption 
algorithm to files on the disk so that they are not readable by humans 
without decryption.29 For example, a word processing document listing 
the secret formula for Coke could be encrypted so that only persons with 
the decryption key could read the information in the file. While 
encryption of selected files might be adequate for some purposes, a third 
party could still view non-encrypted files on the hard drive, and also 
could learn by inspecting the hard drive that it contains encrypted files. 
The following shows how this sort of encryption relates to the computer 
architecture:
“Full disk encryption” (FDE), in contrast, is a method of securing the 
entire disk so that all of the disk’s contents are encrypted and no one 
without the necessary password and key can even boot up the disk.30
                                                                                                                     
29. See Troubleshooting Hard Drive Encryption Issues, DELL KNOWLEDGE BASE,
https://www.dell.com/support/article/us/en/19/sln155364/troubleshooting-hard-drive-encryption
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Arguably, FDE obscures the question whether the disk contains any files 
at all—although, as discussed in Part II below, courts have not yet 
correctly understood the implications of this technology for Fifth 
Amendment jurisprudence. 
FDE involves the encryption of all files on the hard drive together 
with a password or biometric lock on the drive’s boot sector.31 The FDE 
application writes some code to the drive’s boot sector that interacts with 
the BIOS upon start-up.32 This code requires the entry of a user-generated 
password in order for the boot sequence to continue.33 Once the machine 
boots up, the user-generated password or biometric identifier can be used 
as a “seed” for a randomly-generated encryption key.34 The encryption 
key is employed in connection with an algorithm such as AES to encrypt 
all the files on the hard drive.35 While the user is working with a file, the 
decryption key makes the file readable to the user and encrypts any 
additional content on the fly.36 This sort of encryption scheme can be 
illustrated as follows:
                                                                                                                     
31. Kaspersky Lab Online Courses, KL 108.10: Encryption, Ch. 2: Full Disk Encryption,
KASPERSKY LAB, slide 2, http://support.kaspersky.com/learning/courses/kl_108.10/unit1_ chapter2.
32. SYMANTEC, WHITE PAPER: HOW DRIVE ENCRYPTION WORKS 1–2 (2012),
http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/white_papers/b-how-drive-encryption-works
_WP_21275920.pdf (last visited Apr. 1, 2018).
33. Id. at 1.
34. Kaspersky Lab Online Courses, KL 108.10: Encryption, Ch. 2: Full Disk Encryption,
supra note 31, at slide 4.
35. Id. at slide 2.
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FDE is a widely available technology. Until very recently, an open 
source project called “TrueCrypt” was freely available to anyone 
online.37 Commercial FDE products such as “DriveCrypt” can be 
purchased for less than $60, and products such as Sophos SafeGuard 
work with Microsoft Bitlocker to provide enterprise-level encryption.38
Even more directly, Microsoft Bitlocker is now integrated with Windows 
10, so that FDE is available to any Windows 10 user.39
II. THE FIFTH AMENDMENT MEETS ENCRYPTION
A. Background
The Fifth Amendment states that “[n]o person . . . shall be compelled
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”40 This provision 
does not protect against mere disclosure of private information.41 Privacy 
is the domain of the Fourth Amendment and its probable cause, warrant, 
and related requirements.42 As the Supreme Court stated in Fisher v. 
United States,43 “the Fifth Amendment does not independently proscribe 
the compelled production of every sort of incriminating evidence but 
applies only when the accused is compelled to make a testimonial 
communication that is incriminating.”44 The fact that a warrant or 
subpoena might require a criminal suspect to produce documents that 
might contain incriminating information therefore does not in itself 
                                                                                                                     
37. The TrueCrypt source code was available at http://truecrypt.sourceforge.net/ until the 
code’s developers shocked observers by discontinuing the site. See TrueCrypt Final Release 
Repository, GIBSON RES. CORP., https://www.grc.com/misc/truecrypt/truecrypt.htm (last visited 
Mar. 16, 2018); see also James Lyne, Open Source Crypto TrueCrypt Disappears with Suspicious 
Cloud of Mystery, FORBES (May 29, 2014, 3:16 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/james
lyne/2014/05/29/open-source-crypto-truecrypt-disappears-with-suspicious-cloud-of-mystery/;
Tales from the TrueCrypt, ECONOMIST (June 7, 2014), http://www.economist.com/ news/science-
and-technology/21603407-mysterious-useful-piece-software-disappears-mysteriously-tales.
38. DriveCrypt 1344-Bit – Disk Encryption, SECURSTAR, http://www.securstar.biz/
drivecrypt.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2018); Sophos SafeGuard Enterprise, SOPHOS
http://www.sophos.com/en-us/medialibrary/PDFs/factsheets/sophossafeguardenterprisedsna.pdf
?la=en (last visited Mar. 16, 2018); BitLocker, MICROSOFT: WINDOWS IT PRO CENTER (Oct.
16, 2017), https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/bitlocker/
bitlocker-overview.
39. See Bitlocker Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ), MICROSOFT: WINDOWS IT PRO 
CENTER (Oct. 16, 2017), https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-
protection/bitlocker/bitlocker-frequently-asked-questions.
40. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
41. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 401 (1976).
42. Id.
43. 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
44. Id. at 408 (emphasis omitted).
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violate the Fifth Amendment’s protection against compelled self-
incrimination.45
The Supreme Court has wrestled with this distinction between 
“privacy” and “testimony” in a long line of cases going back to 
Schmerber v. California.46 In Schmerber, the defendant was in a car 
accident and was arrested at a hospital on suspicion of driving under the 
influence of alcohol.47 At the direction of a police officer, a physician at 
the hospital took a blood sample, which was tested for blood alcohol 
level.48 The defendant claimed that this non-consensual blood test 
violated his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.49 The 
Court disagreed.50
According to the Court, “[t]he distinction which has emerged, often 
expressed in different ways, is that the privilege is a bar against 
compelling ‘communications’ or ‘testimony,’ but that compulsion which 
makes a suspect or accused the source of ‘real or physical evidence’ does 
not violate it.”51 The Schmerber Court acknowledged that “there will be 
many cases in which such a distinction is not readily drawn. Some tests 
seemingly directed to obtain ‘physical evidence,’ for example, lie 
detector tests measuring changes in body function during interrogation, 
may actually be directed to eliciting responses which are essentially 
testimonial.”52 Nevertheless, the Court concluded that “[n]ot even a 
shadow of testimonial compulsion upon or enforced communication by 
the accused was involved either in the extraction or in the chemical 
analysis.”53
Subsequently, Fisher tested the line between privacy and testimony in 
relation to documentary evidence.54 In that case, the defendants were 
accused of tax violations and the documents were subpoenaed from the 
defendants’ accountant or attorney.55 The defendants argued that 
compelled production of the documents would amount to an admission 
that the documents existed and were under their control.56 The Court 
rejected this argument.57 According to the Court,
                                                                                                                     
45. Id.
46. 384 U.S. 757 (1966); id. at 764.
47. Id. at 758. 
48. Id.
49. Id. at 759.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 764.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 765.
54. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 421–23 (1976).
55. Id. at 394.
56. Id. at 410.
57. Id. at 410–11.
9
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It is doubtful that implicitly admitting the existence and 
possession of the papers rises to the level of testimony within 
the protection of the Fifth Amendment. The papers belong 
to the accountant, were prepared by him, and are the kind 
usually prepared by an accountant working on the tax returns 
of his client. Surely the Government is in no way relying on 
the “truth-telling” of the taxpayer to prove the existence of 
or his access to the documents. . . .58
The Court then introduced what has become known as the “foregone 
conclusion” doctrine:
The existence and location of the papers are a foregone 
conclusion and the taxpayer adds little or nothing to the sum 
total of the Government’s information by conceding that he 
in fact has the papers. Under these circumstances by 
enforcement of the summons “no constitutional rights are 
touched. The question is not of testimony but of 
surrender.”59
The Fisher Court listed many kinds of potentially incriminating 
physical evidence a criminal suspect could be compelled to produce 
without implicating the Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination, including blood samples, handwriting exemplars, voice 
exemplars, and trying on items of clothing.60 Each of these examples 
involved the compulsion of some act that was not itself considered 
testimonial. Other examples of compelled conduct have included 
compelling the suspect to submit to “fingerprinting, photographing, or 
measurements, to write or speak for identification, to appear in court, to 
stand, to assume a stance, to walk, or to make a particular gesture.”61
It is unclear from the Fisher Court’s “foregone conclusion” statement 
whether a given act is inherently non-testimonial or an exception to the 
Fifth Amendment privilege. This confusion is evident in the forced 
decryption cases discussed in Section II.B below. The confusion is 
heightened by two Supreme Court cases subsequent to Fisher that also 
                                                                                                                     
58. Id. at 411 (quoting In re Harris, 221 U.S. 274 (1911)).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 408 (citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763–64 (1966) (refusing to 
extend the protection of the Fifth Amendment privilege to blood samples)); United States v. 
Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 222–23 (1967) (refusing to extend the protection of the Fifth Amendment 
privilege to voice exemplars); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 265–67 (1967) (refusing to 
extend the protection of the Fifth Amendment privilege to handwriting exemplars); Holt v. United 
States, 218 U.S. 245 (1910) (refusing to extend the protection of the Fifth Amendment privilege 
to clothing).
61. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 764.
10
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factor into the “act of production”/“foregone conclusion” analysis: Doe 
v. United States62 and United States v. Hubbell.63
In Doe, the principles discussed in Schmerber and Fisher were applied 
to a proposed order requiring a criminal defendant to sign a consent form 
authorizing foreign banks to produce his banking records.64 The 
government suspected the defendant had deposited unreported income in 
foreign banks.65 The defendant argued that signing the consent forms 
would constitute a “testimonial communication” because it would 
comprise “a declarative statement of consent made by Doe to the foreign 
banks.”66 Justice Blackmun, writing for the Court, disagreed.67
According to Justice Blackmun, “in order to be testimonial, an 
accused’s communication must itself, explicitly or implicitly, relate a 
factual assertion or disclose information. Only then is a person compelled 
to be a ‘witness’ against himself.”68 The primary purpose of the Fifth 
Amendment, Justice Blackmun noted, was to prevent the “inquisitorial 
method of putting the accused upon his oath and compelling him to 
answer questions designed to uncover uncharged offenses, without 
evidence from another source.”69 The consent forms at issue did not 
identify any specific account, state whether any documents were in 
existence at any particular bank, or include any admission about the 
authenticity of any records produced by any bank.70
The sole dissenter, Justice Stevens, argued that “[i]f John Doe can be 
compelled to use his mind to assist the Government in developing its 
case, I think he will be forced ‘to be a witness against himself.’”71 Justice 
Stevens argued that a witness “may in some cases be forced to surrender 
a key to a strongbox containing incriminating documents, but I do not 
believe he can be compelled to reveal the combination to his wall safe-
by word or deed.”72
In the Court’s next effort to distinguish between compelled testimony 
and compelled production of physical evidence, United States v. Hubbell,
Justice Stevens wrote the majority opinion.73 Hubbell involved the 
famous (or infamous) “Whitewater” investigation and prosecutions of 
                                                                                                                     
62. 487 U.S. 201 (1988).
63. 530 U.S. 27 (2000); id. at 36; Doe, 487 U.S. at 209.
64. Id. at 203. 
65. Id. at 202.
66. Id. at 208.
67. Id. at 219.
68. Id. at 210.
69. Id. at 212.
70. Id. at 215–16. 
71. Id. at 220 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 219.
73. United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 29 (2000).
11
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Webster Hubbell.74 Hubbell was serving a sentence for tax evasion and 
mail fraud resulting from a plea agreement with the Whitewater Special 
Prosecutor when he was served with a subpoena duces tecum for 
documents before a grand jury investigating further alleged fraud 
involving Whitewater.75 Hubbell was ordered by the trial court to produce 
the documents under the federal grand jury immunity statute.76 He 
produced the documents in response to this order, and was subsequently 
indicted on further tax and mail fraud charges.77 The trial court dismissed 
the indictment because it believed the indictment was based on 
information in the documents in violation of the immunity statute.78 After 
an appeal and a somewhat complicated conditional plea agreement, the 
immunity issue was heard by the Supreme Court.79
Justice Stevens noted that “there is a significant difference between 
the use of compulsion to extort communications from a defendant and 
compelling a person to engage in conduct that may be incriminating.”80
He further acknowledged that “a person may be required to produce 
specific documents even though they contain incriminating assertions of 
fact or belief because the creation of those documents was not 
‘compelled’ within the meaning of the privilege.”81 Nevertheless, Justice 
Stevens stated, the “act of production” itself could constitute a testimonial 
admission that “the papers existed, were in [the defendant’s] possession 
or control, and were authentic.”82 According to Justice Stevens, 
[i]t was unquestionably necessary for respondent to make 
extensive use of ‘the contents of his own mind’ in identifying 
the hundreds of documents responsive to the requests in the 
subpoena. . . . The assembly of those documents was like 
telling an inquisitor the combination to a wall safe, not like 
being forced to surrender the key to a strongbox.83
Justice Stevens also rejected the government’s argument that the 
“foregone conclusion” analysis in Fisher saved the government’s case 
against Hubbell. According to Justice Stevens, 
                                                                                                                     
74. Id. at 30.
75. Id. at 30–31.
76. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 6002–6003).
77. Id. at 31.
78. Id. at 31–32.
79. Id. at 34.
80. Id. at 34–35.
81. Id. at 35–36.
82. Id. at 36.
83. Id. at 43.
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[w]hatever the scope of this ‘foregone conclusion’ rationale, 
the facts of this case plainly fall outside of it. While in Fisher
the Government already knew that the documents were in 
the attorneys’ possession and could independently confirm 
their existence and authenticity through the accountants who 
created them, here the Government has not shown that it had 
any prior knowledge of either the existence or the 
whereabouts of the 13,120 pages of documents ultimately 
produced by respondent.84
He therefore held that the indictment would violate the statutory grant of 
immunity and must be dismissed.85
Under the distinction between testimonial and non-testimonial acts of 
production, then, (1) the provision of physical acts or samples, such as 
standing in a lineup or giving a blood sample; and (2) the mere production 
of documents generally are not considered testimonial, while acts that 
convey information about the nature, location, or authenticity of 
documents or materials could be testimonial. Justice Stevens’ dicta 
concerning the strongbox key and combination in his dissent in Doe,
echoed in his majority opinion in Hubbell as applied to the foregone 
conclusion doctrine, has been featured in the contemporary debate over 
compelled disclosure of passwords tied to encryption keys. As the 
summary in the next Section suggests, courts are struggling to apply these 
concepts in the domain of computer files and digital encryption.
B. Recent Cases Involving Compelled Decryption
A handful of recent cases address how these principles should apply 
to encrypted hard drives. As noted above, many of these cases assume 
that the production of a password protecting encryption is a testimonial 
act, but construe the “foregone conclusion” doctrine as an exception to 
the Fifth Amendment privilege. However, in an important—but
incorrectly decided—case, the Eleventh Circuit has held that the foregone 
conclusion doctrine may not apply when the contents of a hard drive are 
both unknown and encrypted.86 Three other cases involve encryption that 
is accessed by biometric identification (in those cases, a fingerprint), with 
differing results.87
                                                                                                                     
84. Id. at 44–45.
85. Id. at 45–46.
86. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Mar. 25, 2011, 670 F.3d 1335,
1344–46 (11th Cir. 2012).
87. See State v. Diamond, 890 N.W.2d 143, 150–51 (Minn. Ct. App. 2017), aff’d, 905 
N.W.2d 870 (Minn. 2018); State v. Stahl, 206 So. 3d 124, 134–35 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016);
Commonwealth v. Baust, 89 Va. Cir. 267, 2014 WL 10355635, at *4 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2014).
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1.  Compelled Production of Passwords Controlling Encryption
In one of the earliest reported cases on this issue, United States v. 
Fricosu,88 FBI agents had seized a number of computers, pursuant to 
valid search warrants, at the home where defendant resided.89 Of three 
laptop computers seized, one was encrypted with a program called PGP 
Desktop.90 During a recorded conversation with her husband, a co-
defendant who was incarcerated, Ms. Fricosu seemed to admit that the 
encrypted laptop contained a file or files relevant to the investigation.91
The government then sought a writ under the All Writs Act compelling 
defendant to produce the contents of the encrypted hard dive.92
Based on the recorded telephone conversation, the court concluded 
that “[t]here is little question here but that the government knows of the 
existence and location of the computer’s files. The fact that it does not 
know the specific content of any specific documents is not a barrier to 
production.”93 The court further found that that “the government has met 
its burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the Toshiba 
Satellite M305 laptop computer belongs to Ms. Fricosu, or, in the 
alternative, that she was its sole or primary user, who, in any event, can 
access the encrypted contents of that laptop computer.”94 It was also 
significant to the court that the government offered Ms. Friscosu 
immunity.95 The court therefore found that an order requiring production 
of the laptop hard drive’s decrypted contents would not violate the Fifth 
Amendment.96 The order entered by the court compelled the defendant to 
perform the steps necessary to decrypt the computer’s contents and 
prohibited the government from using those contents against Ms. 
Friscosu.97
In contrast, the Eleventh Circuit suggested in In re Grand Jury 
Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated March 25, 2011,98 that the foregone 
                                                                                                                     
88. 841 F. Supp. 2d 1232 (D. Colo. 2012).
89. Id. at 1234.
90. Id. PGP Desktop is a form of FDE offered by Symantec. See Easy-to-Use Decryption 
Software, SYMANTEC, https://www.symantec.com/products-solutions/products/buy.jsp%3Fpcid 
%3Dpcat_info_risk_comp%26pvid%3Ddesktop_home_1%26om_sem_cid%3Dbiz_sem_nam_u
s_Google_SMB_Store_PGP_Desktop_Home%26mktsrc%3Dpaidsearch%26om_sem_kw%3Dp
gp%2Bhome (last visited Apr. 14, 2018) (describing the PGP Desktop Home product and showing 
the price per license).
91. Fricosu, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 1235.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1237.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1238.
96. Id. at 1237.
97. Id.
98. 670 F.3d 1335 (11th Cir. 2012). 
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conclusion doctrine cannot apply unless the government knows of 
specific files subject to the warrant or other process that are stored on the 
subject device.99 Central to the court’s decision in that case was the 
court’s belief that the government did not know whether any files resided 
on the encrypted portion of the defendant’s hard drive.100 The court noted 
that the encryption software used by the defendant fills up free space on 
the encrypted portion of a drive with random characters.101 According to 
the court, “because the TrueCrypt [encryption] program displays random 
characters if there are files and if there is empty space, we simply do not 
know what, if anything, was hidden based on the facts before us.”102
The court concluded that, because “random characters are not files,” the 
government had not shown “that the drives actually contain any files, nor 
has it shown which of the estimated twenty million files the drives are 
capable of holding may prove useful.”103
The Eleventh Circuit’s approach did not prevail in one of the most 
comprehensive opinions on forced encryption in the federal and state case 
law, Commonwealth v. Gelfgatt.104 In that case, the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court held, in a 5–2 opinion, that the foregone 
conclusion doctrine can apply to passwords that protect encryption 
keys.105 Defendant Gelfgatt, an attorney, was charged with crimes 
involving mortgage fraud.106 Pursuant to a search warrant, state police 
seized four computers from Gelfgatt’s residence that were encrypted with 
DriveCrypt Plus full disk encryption software.107 During his 
interrogation, Gelfgatt admitted that the computers were encrypted and 
that he held the passwords needed to decrypt the computers, but refused 
to turn over the passwords.108 The Commonwealth moved for an order to 
compel decryption, which was denied by the lower courts.109
                                                                                                                     
99. Id. at 1344–46.
100. Id. at 1346 (“Nothing in the record before us reveals that the Government knows 
whether any files exist and are located on the hard drives . . . .”).
101. Id. at 1340 n.11.
102. Id. at 1347. 
103. Id.; cf. SEC v. Huang, 2015 WL 5611644, at *2 (E.D. Pa. 2015) (following In re Grand 
Jury).
104. 11 N.E.3d 605 (Mass. 2014); id. at 619. The author of this Article filed an amicus brief 
in this case in support of the Commonwealth, joined by The Massachusetts Chiefs of Police 
Association and NW3C (The National White Collar Crime Center). See Brief of Amicus Curiae
Professor David W. Opderbeck, Supported by the Massachusetts Chiefs of Police Association, 
Inc. and NW3C, Inc., Gelfgatt, 11 N.E.3d 605 (Mass. 2014). 
105. Id. at 617.
106. Id. at 609.
107. Id. at 610.
108. Id. at 610–11.
109. Id. at 611.
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The Massachusetts Supreme Court assumed, without much analysis,
that the disclosure of a password is a testimonial communication.110 The 
court stated that “[b]y such action, the defendant implicitly would be 
acknowledging that he has ownership and control of the computers and 
their contents,” which differs from giving a physical evidence such as a 
blood sample or handwriting exemplar.111 However, the court held that 
the foregone conclusion exception applied because there was clear 
evidence that Gelfgatt had been involved in some of the allegedly 
fraudulent mortgage transactions and had acknowledged that he kept 
encrypted files relating to these transactions.112
Justice Lenk, joined by Justice Duffy, filed a dissenting opinion.113
Justice Lenk relied heavily on the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in In re 
Grand Jury Subpoena for the argument that the government must show a 
degree of particularity about particular files or documents that is 
“significantly greater than what is required to show probable cause.”114
Therefore, Justice Lenk concluded, “the ‘reasonable particularity’ 
standard requires much more than government knowledge that a 
defendant owns or has access to a particular computer.”115 In Justice 
Lenk’s view, the Commonwealth could not satisfy this standard.
Like the majority in Gelfgatt, the Third Circuit also recently has 
questioned the Eleventh Circuit’s approach.116 In United States v. Apple 
Macpro Computer,117 the defendant was suspected of accessing child 
pornography over the internet.118 A state search warrant was issued for 
the defendant’s residence, and the police seized an Apple iPhone 5S, an 
Apple iPhone 6 Plus, an Apple Mac Pro Computer, and two attached 
external hard drives, all of which were encrypted.119 U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security Agents then obtained a federal search warrant to
examine these devices.120 The defendant voluntarily provided a password 
for the iPhone 5S, but refused to provide passwords to decrypt the Mac 
Pro or hard drives.121 The defendant also provided the passcode to unlock 
                                                                                                                     
110. Id. at 614.
111. Id. at 615.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 617 (Lenk, J., dissenting). 
114. Id. at 620–22.
115. Id. at 622.
116. See United States v. Apple Macpro Comput., 851 F.3d 238, 248 (3d Cir. 2017).
117. 851 F.3d 238 (3d Cir. 2017). 
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the iPhone 6 Plus, but refused to provide a passcode for an application on 
that phone that contained encrypted files.122
Government forensic analysts discovered the Mac Pro password 
without the defendant’s assistance and found on the internal hard drive 
one child pornography image as well as logs showing that the computer 
had been used to access known child pornography sites and to download 
thousands of known child pornography files.123 Investigators also 
interviewed the defendant’s sister, who stated that the defendant had 
shown her child pornography images from the encrypted external hard 
drives.124 Based on this information, the government obtained an order 
under the All Writs Act requiring the defendant to produce the devices 
and hard drives in a fully unencrypted state.125
The magistrate judge denied the defendant’s motion to quash the All 
Writs Act order.126 The defendant subsequently appeared for a forensic 
examination at the Delaware County Police Department.127 He produced 
the iPhone 6 Plus with all files decrypted, which included photographs of 
his four-year-old niece’s genitals.128 He claimed he could not remember 
the correct passwords to unlock the external hard drives and subsequently 
was held in contempt for failing to produce those drives in a decrypted 
state.129
The Third Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion to quash.130 The 
Third Circuit noted that the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in In re Grand 
Jury Subpoena would not require a different result because the evidence 
was sufficient to show that files existed on the encrypted devices and that 
the defendant could access those devices.131 In a footnote, the Third 
Circuit also noted that the Government’s knowledge of files on the 
encrypted devices might not reflect the proper inquiry under the foregone 
conclusion exception.132 Instead, the court suggested, “a very sound 
argument can be made that the foregone conclusion doctrine properly 
focuses on whether the Government already knows the testimony that is 
implicit in the act of production” and that the relevant testimony is that 
                                                                                                                     
122. Id. at 243.
123. Id. at 242.
124. Id. at 248.






131. Id. at 248.
132. Id. at 248 n.7.
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the defendant knows the passwords to decrypt the devices.133 If the 
surrounding evidence shows that this testimony is a foregone conclusion, 
the exception might apply even absent any showing of what files the 
device might contain.134
2.  Compelled Production of Biometric Identification 
Controlling Encryption
Other courts have distinguished passwords and biometric 
identification to unlock encrypted devices. In Commonwealth v. Baust,135
a Virginia trial court held that production of a passcode to a cell phone is 
a testimonial act and that the foregone conclusion doctrine does not apply 
because the subject of the testimony is not about the existence and 
authenticity of documents on the phone, but rather is about the password 
itself.136 The court noted: “[I]f the password was a foregone conclusion, 
the Commonwealth would not need to compel Defendant to produce it 
because they would already know it.”137 In contrast, the court held, “[t]he 
fingerprint, like a key . . . does not require the witness to divulge anything 
through his mental processes,” and therefore the biometric identification 
could be compelled.138
Other courts have disagreed with this distinction. In State v. Stahl,139
for example, a Florida appellate court questioned Justice Stevens’s
distinction in Doe between a key and a combination, and noted that 
surrendering a key to a strongbox or stating the combination to a 
strongbox lock has the same effect.140 The court further questioned “the 
continuing viability of any distinction as technology advances” and 
suggested that the use of a passcode on a smart phone should not result 
in greater constitutional protection than the use of a “fingerprint as the 
passcode.”141 The court held that the foregone conclusion doctrine should 
apply if the State establishes three elements: (1) “it knows with 
reasonable particularity that the passcode exists”; (2) the passcode “is 
within the accused’s possession or control”; and (3) the passcode “is 
                                                                                                                     
133. Id. The relevant testimony, according to the Third Circuit, could simply be “I, John Doe, 
know the password for these devices.” Id.
134. Id.
135. 89 Va. Cir. 267, 2014 WL 10355635 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2014).
136. Id. at *4.
137. Id.
138. Id.; cf. State v. Diamond, 890 N.W.2d 143, 149–51 (Minn. Ct. App. 2017) (upholding 
order to produce fingerprint to unlock cellphone and distinguishing testimonial act of producing 
a password from non-testimonial act of supplying a fingerprint key), aff’d, 905 N.W.2d 870 
(Minn. 2018).
139. 206 So. 3d 124 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016).
140. Id. at 134–35.
141. Id. at 135.
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authentic.”142 The element of authenticity, the court suggested, would 
invariably be satisfied, because “[i]f the doctrines are to continue to be 
applied to passcodes, decryption keys, and the like, we must recognize 
that the technology is self-authenticating [because] no other means of 
authentication may exist.”143 Therefore, the court noted, “[i]f the phone 
or computer is accessible once the passcode or key has been entered, the 
passcode or key is authentic.”144 In short, the court concluded, “[t]his is 
a case of surrender and not testimony.”145
III. ENCRYPTION, SPEECH, AND TESTIMONY
A. What Is “Testimony?”
As discussed in Part II, the cases that have addressed compelled 
disclosure of encryption keys under the Fifth Amendment circle around 
the question whether an encryption key or password is a form of speech 
or communication. Case law does not explore the line between speech or 
communication and actions that are not speech or communication with 
any degree of philosophical depth, and commentators continue to dispute 
the distinction.146
Some scholars have sought to circumvent the question by grounding 
the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination in a right of 
privacy.147 As Ronald Allen and Kristin Mace have noted, however, 
privacy based justifications “cannot explain why the privilege applies or 
when it does,” since the government otherwise has a “right to every man’s 
evidence,” even if that evidence incriminates a family member or is 
embarrassing even if not incriminating.148 In contrast, privacy questions 
are directly addressed by the Fourth Amendment’s search and seizure 
limitations.149
The Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination, although 
involving underlying privacy interests, seems to concern a particular kind 
                                                                                                                     
142. Id. at 136.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 137; see Efren Lemus, Comment, When Fingerprints Are Key: Reinstating 
Privacy to the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Light of Fingerprint Encryption of 
Smartphones, 70 SMU L. REV. 533, 539–44 (2017).
146. See, e.g., Ronald J. Allen & M. Kristin Mace, The Self-Incrimination Clause Explained 
and Its Future Predicted, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 243, 259 (2004) (noting that “[t]he Court 
has failed to provide a definition of ‘testimony’ that can explain its own cases”). 
147. See id. at 261.
148. Id. at 261–62 (quoting Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 443 (1972)). 
149. See William J. Stuntz, Self-Incrimination and Excuse, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1227, 1236
(1988).
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of speech-act. Other scholars, along with most of the case law, therefore 
have focused on what comprises “testimony.”150
Allen and Mace suggest the Supreme Court views “testimony” as an 
act of substantive cognition—“the product of cognition that results in 
holding or asserting propositions with truth-value.”151 They suggest that 
“[c]ognition ‘involves the acquisition, storage, retrieval, and use of 
knowledge.’”152 They apply their definition to the example of a suspect 
who is compelled to submit a polygraph examination while the examiner 
points to locations on a map where a murder victim’s body might be 
buried, such that the suspect’s physiological responses reveal the likely 
location of the body.153 As Allen and Mace note, “there is perhaps 
universal agreement” that this evidence should be inadmissible under the 
Fifth Amendment to implicate the suspect in the murder, even though the 
suspect has not verbally spoken.154 They suggest that their definition of 
“testimony” explains this intuition because the polygraph test records 
biometric responses that convey knowledge held by the suspect.155
Allen and Mace recognize that the foregone conclusion doctrine poses 
problems for this definition.156 The act of producing a document involves 
cognition, and it seems unclear under their theory why any exception 
should be made for the Fifth Amendment testimonial protection of such 
an act just because the location and existence of the document is a 
foregone conclusion. They suggest the difference could arise from the 
degree of cognition required.157 If the witness must exercise relatively 
minimal cognitive “efforts,” such as when a relatively narrow subpoena 
describes as specific set of documents, there is less offense than when the 
witness must expend greater cognitive efforts to identify, locate, and 
gather documents potentially responsive to a broader subpoena.158
It is unclear, however, what Allen and Mace mean by cognitive 
“efforts” or whether such a concept has any scientific or philosophical 
purchase. Could we measure, say, the number of neuronal connections 
                                                                                                                     
150. One scholar who avoided the question of defining “testimony” without adopting a 
privacy-based rationale was William Stuntz. See id. at 1228. Stuntz argued that Fifth Amendment 
privilege is justified because it excuses witness from the temptation to commit perjury. See 
generally id. at 1228–29. This is a fascinating rationale for the privilege generally, but it does not 
seek to address, given the privilege exists, whether or when a foregone conclusion doctrine should 
apply to limit the privilege.
151. Allen & Mace, supra note 146, at 266.
152. Id. at 267 (quoting MARGARET W. MATLIN, COGNITION 2 (3d ed. 1994)).
153. Id. at 248–49.
154. Id. at 249.
155. Id. at 269.
156. Id. at 287–89.
157. Id. at 288–89.
158. Id.
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used to respond to a narrow subpoena versus a broad subpoena? The 
notion of measuring neuronal questions, of course, is not realistic, but the 
point is that cognitive “effort” seems impossible to quantify. Moreover, 
even if some measure of cognitive “efforts” were possible, why would it 
matter to a definition of “testimony?” Relatively little cognitive effort, 
presumably, is expended in the response to a simple question such as,
“Did you kill the victim—yes or no?” But a witness could not be 
compelled to answer such a question.
In his article Testimony, Michael Pardo discusses when a 
communicative act might comprise “testimony” based on the speaker’s 
intent to convey knowledge.159 Pardo’s main concern in that paper is 
epistemology, or what counts as knowledge.160 In the category of “natural 
testimony,” Pardo notes, (1) “the speaker must intend a listener or an 
audience to believe that the speaker has competence, authority, or 
credentials to assert the proposition,” and (2) “the content of the 
communicative act must be what conveys information to the hearer.”161
However, the actual hearer need not be the intended hearer, as in the case 
of a journal entry or diary later read by a third party.162 It is enough that 
the speaker intends to convey the requisite authority to some specific 
audience and that the communicative act conveys information to 
whomever ultimately is the hearer.163
Pardo’s article explores various “epistemic ‘pathways’” through 
which natural testimony can generate knowledge, as well as “epistemic 
‘dead ends’” through which natural testimony sometimes fails to generate 
knowledge.164 He suggests that the rules concerning formal, in-court 
testimony draw fruitfully on this epistemic account of testimony and 
seeks to clarify the problematic question of hearsay as well as various 
constitutional rules concerning testimony.165 Concerning the Fifth 
Amendment, Pardo argues that the Court’s distinction between 
“testimonial” and other acts first drawn in Schmerber fits his framework 
for what comprises “testimony.”166 An act can satisfy both of Pardo’s two 
conditions whether it is in the form of a verbal statement or action.167
But the act of production doctrine cases, Pardo claims, “have 
analytically confused and misapplied certain aspects of the concept of 
                                                                                                                     
159. Michael S. Pardo, Testimony, 82 TUL. L. REV. 119, 120–21 (2007).
160. See id. at 125–32.
161. Id. at 130–31.
162. Id. at 131–32.
163. Id. at 131.
164. Id. at 139–44.
165. Id. at 144, 148, 164–65.
166. Id. at 178, 188.
167. See id. at 188.
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testimony.”168 He is particularly critical of the Court’s assumption under 
the foregone conclusion doctrine that the government’s prior knowledge 
of the testimony’s contents should matter.169 Pardo concedes that “[i]f a 
speaker knows that the hearer already knows a proposition or has the 
same or superior evidence compared with the speaker, the speaker is not 
testifying to that proposition by asserting it” and further that there is no 
“testimony” when “a hearer who already knows the proposition or 
believes she has the same or superior evidence.”170 Therefore, under 
Pardo’s definition, if the information is a foregone conclusion to the 
government, the act of production is not “testimony” vis-à-vis the 
government. However, Pardo argues, the government is not the only 
audience for the information. A judge or jury, for whom the information 
is not a foregone conclusion, is also an audience, and in many ways a 
more important one.171 Pardo concludes: “[A]n act of production ought 
to be deemed testimonial for purposes of the Self-Incrimination Clause 
when, under the particular circumstances of the case, the act implicitly 
communicates information, and it is within the scope of the right when 
the content of the implicit communication was compelled and is 
incriminating.”172
There are two problems with Pardo’s treatment of this question. First, 
the distinction he draws between “the government” and a judge or jury as 
audiences for the communication is not so clear as he suggests. The 
“government,” (i.e., the prosecution) acts on behalf of the State (i.e., the 
political community of the people), and the judge and jury also act on 
behalf of the state. The “audience,” then, is always the state. The 
differences between the prosecutor, judge, and jury arise from their 
different functions within the machinery of the state. If some information 
presents itself as a “foregone conclusion” to the prosecution—that is, if 
some information is not natural “testimony” to the prosecution—it also 
ipso facto is a foregone conclusion and not formal “testimony” to the
judge and jury. The prosecution, judge, and jury play different roles in 
the system and have different duties from each other. Both the judge and 
jury in their own ways serve as checks to protect accused citizens against 
the excessive zeal of prosecutors in an adversarial system, and the jury 
also serves as a check on judges. Nevertheless, as Judge Jack Weinstein 
                                                                                                                     
168. Id. at 184.
169. See id. at 186.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 188.
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has noted, “[i]n a sense, the jury was, and remains, the direct voice of the 
sovereign, in a collaborative effort with the judge.”173
Second, the question of what comprises the “content” of a 
“communicative act” is precisely what is at issue in an act of production. 
On this point the act of production and foregone conclusion doctrines 
attempt to demarcate between actions that are sufficiently information-
laden to be considered “testimony” and those that are not. 
Consider the compelled blood alcohol test in Schmerber.174 The fact 
that the blood tested was the suspect’s own blood, and the fact of the 
suspect’s blood alcohol content level, is not anything the suspect intends 
to convey, and indeed the suspect does not “convey” it at all, unless the 
suspect is identical with the chemical information in his blood. There is 
no intent involved at all, unless the blood itself has some quality of 
agency or intentionality identical to the suspect’s own agency and 
intentionality. The authority supporting the factual claims that a test was 
performed on this suspect’s blood giving a particular blood alcohol level 
is the authority of the lab technicians who will testify about how the blood 
was drawn and what tests were conducted. The suspect is not required to 
testify about the authenticity of the blood sample or the results of the 
blood test. 
The same is true for the production of papers or things known to be in 
a suspect’s possession. The authority for authenticating that these papers 
were turned over by the suspect in response to a subpoena or warrant is 
inherent in the subpoena or warrant itself and in the fact that the papers 
were turned over. The suspect is not required to testify about the 
authenticity of the documents or the meaning of their contents. The 
authority for these facts resides in other information about the state of the 
world and the actions of other agents, not in any intention or 
communication of the suspect.
In a subsequent article, The Epistemology of Testimony, Pardo refines 
his discussion of these questions.175 In that article, Pardo suggests that 
whether something is considered “testimony” depends on whether the 
defendant is serving as an “epistemic authority” for a proposition.176 For 
example, in the case of a blood sample to determine blood type, Pardo 
suggests, the defendant is not serving as an epistemic authority as to 
                                                                                                                     
173. United States v. Khan, 325 F. Supp. 2d 218, 230 (E.D.N.Y. 2004); cf. Douglas A. 
Berman, Making the Framers’ Case, and a Modern Case, for Jury Involvement in Habeas 
Adjudication, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 887, 888 (2010).
174. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 758 (1966).
175. Michael S. Pardo, Self-Incrimination and the Epistemology of Testimony, 30 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 1023 (2008).
176. Id. at 1040.
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blood type, so this kind of sample is not “testimony.”177 He suggests that 
“[o]ne does not have to posit distinct material and non-physical realms to 
see an epistemic difference between words and blood.”178
This notion of “epistemic authority” is helpful, but in the age of DNA 
evidence, the line between “words and blood” might be fuzzier than 
Pardo suggests. Interestingly for the purpose of this paper, the Sixth, 
Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have held that Schmerber applies to blood 
tests to extract genetic information stored in a national database.179 A
person’s DNA conveys far more information than a blood alcohol test, 
including, for example, the ability to place a person at a crime scene based 
on DNA samples from hair, blood, skin, semen, and the like left at the 
scene. A person’s DNA also can communicate more definitive 
information in many ways than documents or things in that person’s 
possession. DNA evidence can offer stronger “smoking gun” evidence 
than a smoking gun itself. If a person provides a sample of her blood (or, 
more likely, a mouth swab), implicitly acknowledging it is her blood, and 
the blood (or swab) contains genetic information highly specific to that 
individual, where does the epistemic authority lie? It seems impossible to 
stretch the concept of “testimony” to include DNA evidence, again unless 
we wish to reduce a person’s agency, intentionality, and speech to his or 
her genetic code. Genes do not testify; people testify. This is why notions 
of epistemic authority must be tied to the concept of what comprises a 
communicative act. As Pardo suggests, in “testimony,” a speaker makes 
“an assertion.”180 The concept of an “assertion” involves an intent to 
convey information.
The example of genetic information in relation to “testimony” is 
particularly apt to the discussion of decryption keys because DNA, like 
encryption keys and passwords, is a kind of “code.” The question about 
the connection between “information” and “communication” is basic to 
information theory, which underlies modern computing technology. The 
following Section shows how information theory clarifies the foregone 
conclusion doctrine in relation to encryption keys and passwords. It 
further explores this difficult question as it has arisen in two other areas 
of law: the First Amendment and copyright law. Part IV then extends 
these insights to argue that neither encryption code nor passwords that 
                                                                                                                     
177. Id.
178. Id. at 1041.
179. United States. v. Reynard, 473 F.3d 1008, 1021 (9th Cir. 2007); United States. v. Bean,
214 F. App’x 568, 571 (6th Cir. 2007); United States v. Hook, 471 F.3d 766, 774 (7th Cir. 2006)
(stating that “the information that is extracted from the blood, DNA, is another form of physical, 
genetic identification of an individual not unlike a photograph or fingerprint and is thus also not 
protected by the Fifth Amendment”).
180. Id. at 1037.
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protect encryption are forms of “speech” that could comprise testimonial 
acts.
B. Encryption, Semiotics, and Information Theory
It should be clear from the discussion of the Caesar Cipher in Part I 
above that the key “13” communicates nothing at all about the substance 
of the text “cynl vg ntnva fnz.” Arguably, the number 13 in this context 
has no semantic content. The number 13 does not even say, “This
message is encoded with a ROT13 cipher.” A person who wants to use 
the number 13 as a key would already have to know (or guess) that this 
is a ROT13-encoded message. The number itself is nothing but the key 
that converts “cynl vg ntnva fnz” into the readable English message “play 
it again sam.” On the other hand, arguably, to a person with at least some 
background in encryption—such as a user of an Internet bulletin board in 
which ROT13 is frequently employed—the number 13 itself could
communicate that a certain kind of encryption is being used.181
In this regard, a subtle but very important distinction must be drawn 
between “language” and “information.” Language refers to the syntax 
and grammar used to signify things or states of affairs. Philosophers have 
long recognized that there is a basic distinction between a “sign” 
(language) and something that is “signified” (information).182 As the 
great philosopher and theologian Augustine of Hippo argued: “[A] sign 
is something which, offering itself to the senses, conveys something other 
to the intellect.”183 Information, in contrast, can be defined as the content 
of states of affairs embodied in “well formed, meaningful and truthful 
data.”184 That is, information is the content of states of affairs, which must 
be expressed in language to be understood by humans.185 Information is 
the actual content of that which is signified, and language is the means 
by which signs pointing to the signified are constructed.
This dynamic raises interesting questions in metaphysics. Does the 
thing signified by a sign possess an actual existence? Is “information” in 
some sense a fundamental element of the cosmos, along with energy and 
matter? In Platonic and other metaphysically realist philosophy, echoed 
in the quote from Augustine above, there is an actual ideal realm to which 
                                                                                                                     
181. For a discussion of the use of ROT13 in early Internet Usenet groups see ROT13 on 
Wikipedia. See ROT13, WIKIPEDIA https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ROT13 (last visited Mar. 14, 
2018).
182. See Medieval Semiotics, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, § 1–2.1 (last edited 
on May 11, 2011), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/semiotics-medieval/.
183. Id. at § 2.1 (quoting Augustine, De Doctrina Christiana, II.1.) (emphasis added). 
184. See Semantic Conceptions of Information, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY,
§ 3.2.3 (last edited on Jan. 7, 2015), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/information-semantic/.  
185. See id.
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signs refer and which provides the universal “form” of particular things 
in the world.186 Much contemporary semantic theory, including much of 
the application of semantics to computer science and artificial 
intelligence, assumes that the sign and the signified are closely related—
that, in some sense, the sign constructs the signified without any external 
referent such as the Platonic realm of “forms” or the Augustinian mind 
of God.187
Aside from these rich metaphysical questions, the close relation 
between sign and signified in computer code means that code is 
essentially arbitrary.188 But if computer code is arbitrary, how can we (or 
the machine) know what is signified? As Kumiko Tanaka-Ishii notes, 
“[o]ne of the basic ways is to take an operational approach and judge the 
equivalence from input and output sets.”189 Since in computing terms 
“output” is a function of the machine, we could say that computer code 
is what it does. In this sense, computer code is not the message itself,
even though code does cause computer machines to output messages.
At the same time, since the code is not the message, code that outputs 
a message can be disaggregated, compressed, or otherwise manipulated 
without destroying the message. This remarkable fact underlies all 
historic forms of cryptography as well as modern telecommunications 
technology.190 A message in English—say, “Watson, come here, I need 
you”—can be converted into an information equivalent, such as 
electromagnetic waves or digital 0’s and 1’s, and this information 
equivalent can be compressed, chopped up, and transmitted or stored. The 
information equivalent can then be retrieved and run through a receiver 
that reproduces the original language.191
When this happens, no new “information” is being created. The state 
of affairs that the “information” encodes or that which is signified—the 
fact that Edison desires Watson to come to the lab—remains the same. In 
fact, modern information theory involves laws of the conservation of 
information, akin to the laws of the conservation of matter in physics. The 
                                                                                                                     
186. See, e.g., KUMIKO TANAKA-ISHII, SEMIOTICS OF PROGRAMMING 54 (Cambridge Univ. 
Press 2010).
187. See id. The metaphysical belief that signs—“code”—construct reality is the instinct 
behind most kinds of Internet exceptionalism. See David W. Opderbeck, Deconstructing 
Jefferson’s Candle: Towards a Critical Realist Approach to Cultural Environmentalism and 
Information Policy, 49 JURIMETRICS 203, 210, 239 (2009).
188. See TANAKA-ISHII, supra note 186, at 67.
189. Id.
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notion of signal “loss,” such as parts of a radio transmission or cell phone 
call that “drop out,” relates to this conservation law.192
These semantic concepts from information theory do not sit entirely 
comfortably with the “linguistic turn” in contemporary analytic 
philosophy. The semantic concept of information assumes a sort of 
metaphysic in which “information” comprises a fundamental reality. This 
reflects the influence of logical positivism on early information theorists 
and cyberneticists such as Claude Shannon and Norbert Weiner.193 The 
problem of language, however, was a key reason for the collapse of 
logical positivism.194 The “sign” rarely, if ever, corresponds directly to 
the “signified” without context. For this reason, some philosophers of 
language, particularly those attracted to “speech-act theory,” distinguish 
the act of speaking (the “illocutionary act”) from the desired state of 
affairs the speaker intends to produce (the “perlocutionary act”). The 
focus shifts from the speech itself to action.195
The shift from speech to action has not been lost on legal theory, 
particularly in relation to statutory interpretation. In his book Legal and 
Political Hermeneutics, first published in 1837, Francis Lieber used the 
example of a “housekeeper” who gives some money to a “domestic” and 
tells the domestic to “fetch some soupmeat.”196 Lieber noted that this 
simple, everyday command includes within it at least eight other unstated 
commands (such as “fetch the meat for the use of the family and not for 
himself”) that the domestic must incorporate into his interpretation of the 
primary command based on context and experience.197
The act of providing the password and decryption key necessary to 
unlock full disk encryption on a computer hard drive resides at the nexus 
between the positivistic-cybernetic information theories that underlie 
computer technology and the act-based theories of language that inform 
contemporary debates in the philosophy of language. This is why the 
problem in legal doctrine seems so vexing: is typing or speaking a 
password, or triggering the application of a coded decryption key, a form 
                                                                                                                     
192. See Claude Shannon, A Mathematical Theory of Communication, 27 BELL SYSTEM 
TECH. J. 379, 379 (1948).
193. For a discussion of logical positivism, see THE COLUMBIA HISTORY OF WESTERN 
PHILOSOPHY at 621–24 (Richard H. Popkin ed., Columbia Univ. Press 1999). For Weiner’s 
germinal work, see NORBERT WIENER, CYBERNETICS, OR THE CONTROL AND COMMUNICATION IN 
THE ANIMAL AND THE MACHINE (M.I.T. Press 2d ed. 1961). For a discussion of Weiner’s life, see
FLO CONWAY & JIM SIEGELMAN, DARK HERO OF THE INFORMATION AGE: IN SEARCH OF NORBERT 
WIENER THE FATHER OF CYBERNETICS (Basic Books 2009).
194. See, e.g., THE COLUMBIA HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY, supra note 193, at 624.
195. See id.
196. FRANCIS LIEBER, LEGAL AND POLITICAL HERMENEUTICS 28 (F.H. Thomas 3d ed. 1880).
197. Id. at 28–29. This example is discussed in a collection of materials on statutory 
interpretation in ESKRIDGE, FRICKEY AND GARRETT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION:
STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 694–95 (West 4th ed. 2007).
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of “speech” that could be testimonial and legally privileged, or is it a form 
of “action,” like handing over a physical key, that in itself would not be 
considered testimonial speech? In the distinction between “privacy” and 
“testimony,” the courts must confront a basic, almost mystical question 
at the intersection of semantic theory, philosophy of information, and 
computer science.
Indeed, as the next two Sections suggest, this problem is not entirely 
unique to the Fifth Amendment context—it is a basic problem for the law 
in the information age. Courts have also wrestled with the question 
whether certain kinds of performative acts or instructions, including the 
operation of computer code, are protected under the First Amendment or 
are subject to statutory copyright protection. The First Amendment and 
copyright cases provide some additional context for our discussion of 
whether forced decryption should be considered “testimonial” under the 
Fifth Amendment.
C. “Speech” in the First Amendment Context
Not all conduct that arguably contains some expressive content is 
considered protected “speech” under the First Amendment. In Spence v. 
State of Washington,198 the Court addressed whether the modification 
(with a peace symbol) and upside-down display of an American flag in 
violation of a state flag desecration statute was a form of protected 
speech.199 In concluding that this conduct was protected speech, the court 
considered four factors: (1) whether the act is “sufficiently imbued with 
elements of communication”; (2) whether the “context in which a symbol 
is used . . . give[s] meaning to the symbol”; (3) whether “[a]n intent to 
convey a particularized message” is present; and (4) whether “in the 
surrounding circumstances the likelihood was great that the message 
would be understood by those who viewed it.”200
As might be expected, slippery guidelines such as these have been 
notoriously difficult to apply. For example, in City of Dallas v. 
Stanglin,201 the Court considered whether a city ordinance that created 
“teenage” dance halls limited to persons between the ages of 14 and 18 
violated the expressional association rights of those persons to associate 
with persons of other age groups. 202 The Court declined to extend First 
Amendment protection to “recreational dancing.”203 According to Justice 
Rehnquist, “[i]t is possible to find some kernel of expression in almost 
                                                                                                                     
198. 418 U.S. 405 (1974). 
199. Id. at 406.
200. Id. at 409–11.
201. 490 U.S. 19 (1989).
202. Id. at 20.
203. Id. at 25.
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every activity a person undertakes—for example, walking down the street 
or meeting one’s friends at a shopping mall—but such a kernel is not 
sufficient to bring the activity within the protection of the First 
Amendment.”204
The nexus between an ordinary function not considered “speech,” 
such as walking to a shopping mall, and protected expression is 
particularly interesting in the context of computer code. The Supreme 
Court has never decided whether, or to what extent, computer code is a 
form of “speech” protected by the First Amendment, although some 
important federal appellate cases hold that computer code is a form of 
protected speech. 
In Junger v. Daley,205 for example, the Sixth Circuit held that export 
control restrictions on encryption software potentially could violate the 
First Amendment.206 The court did not decide the merits, however, 
because the restrictions changed while the case was pending.207 And in 
Universal City Studios v. Corley,208 an important early case challenging 
the anti-circumvention provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright 
Act, the Second Circuit held that computer code is a form of protected 
speech.209 According to the Second Circuit, “[c]ommunication does not 
lose constitutional protection as ‘speech’ simply because it is expressed 
in the language of computer code.”210 The court noted that “[i]f someone 
chose to write a novel entirely in computer object code by using strings 
of 1’s and 0’s for each letter of each word, the resulting work would be 
no different for constitutional purposes than if it had been written in 
English.”211
The categories of being a “witness” against oneself under the Fifth 
Amendment and “speech” under the First Amendment obviously are not 
coextensive. Many “speech” acts for First Amendment purposes would 
not entail being a “witness” against one’s self (or, in the language of the 
modern case law, would not be “testimonial”). But if the relevant analogy 
is the lockbox key versus the lockbox combination, Junger and Corley
seem potentially relevant. If computer code is merely functional and not 
expressive, it seems more like the lockbox key, whereas if computer code 
is expressive, it seems more like the combination.
                                                                                                                     
204. Id.
205. 209 F.3d 481 (6th Cir. 2000). 
206. Id. at 482.
207. Id. at 485.
208. 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001).
209. Id. at 449.
210. Id. at 445.
211. Id. at 445–46. For further discussion of the relationship between source code, speech, 
and encryption, see Allen Cook Barr, Note, Guardians of Your Galaxy S7: Encryption Backdoors 
and the First Amendment, 101 MINN. L. REV. 301 (2016).
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D. “Expression” in Copyright Law
Copyright law is another analogous area for our discussion of speech, 
testimony, and computer code. Copyright protects original works that are 
fixed in a tangible medium of expression.212 U.S. copyright law has long 
recognized that computer code, including both human-readable source 
code and machine-readable object code, are “literary works” subject to 
copyright protection.213 However, copyright extends only to original 
expression and not to any “idea, procedure, process, system, method of 
operation, concept, principle, or discovery.”214 The function of a
computer program therefore is not susceptible to copyright protection. 
The copyrightability of object code is particularly interesting for 
purposes of this Article. Computers operate using a binary language of 
0’s and 1’s, called object code.215 The 0’s and 1’s represent states in a 
circuit: 0 is “off” and 1 is “on.”216 Human beings generally cannot write 
or interpret object code.217 Instead, human programmers employ a coding 
language, which produces source code. For example, some lines of source 
code instructing the system to produce a printout when the user responds 
affirmatively to a query might read:
<display>“Do you wish to print”
If <input> = “yes” then <print>
A program called a “complier” would translate this source code into 
object code, a sequence of 0’s and 1’s that would cause the computer to 
perform the specified functions.218
If object code is compiled by computers and is not readable by 
humans, how can it comprise copyrightable subject matter? An early case 
involving player-pianos, White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo 
Co.,219 laid the foundation for later doctrine.220 The issue in White-Smith
                                                                                                                     
212. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).
213. See, e.g., NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED 
WORKS, FINAL REPORT 1, 16 (1978) [hereinafter CONTU Report]; Apple Comput., Inc. v. 
Franklin Comput. Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1247–49 (3d Cir. 1983), superseded by statute, The 
Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984, as recognized in Brooktree Corp. v. Advanced Micro 
Devices, Inc., 977 F.2d 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
214. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012). 
215. See Apple Comput., Inc., 714 F.2d at 1243.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. This description still generally holds for many kinds of programming, but as 
discussed below, it can be misleading in modern programming environments.
219. 209 U.S. 1 (1908).
220. See generally id. at 1, superseded by statute, 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012), as recognized 
in Apple Comput., Inc., 714 F.2d at 1240.
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was whether a player-piano roll was an infringing “copy” of the protected 
musical score.221 Player-pianos employed cylinders of paper with 
perforations that caused the device’s internal levers to play certain 
notes.222 The master “recording” of perforations was created when a 
person played the notes on a piano rigged to make the corresponding 
perforations in a blank roll.223 Human beings generally could not “write” 
or read these perforations.224
In White-Smith, Justice Day held that the rolls were not infringing 
“copies” under the 1907 Copyright Act.225 In a concurrence, Justice 
Holmes questioned why a machine-readable reproduction should not be 
considered a “copy,” but agreed that the question should be addressed to 
the legislature.226 The significance of the case for contemporary copyright 
doctrine is that the 1909 Copyright Act clarified that “mechanical 
reproductions” of music are protected “copies.” Then, the 1976 
Copyright Act further clarified that a “copy” can include any “material 
object . . . in which a work is fixed . . . and from which the work can be 
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or 
with the aid of a machine or device.” Finally, the 1980 amendment based 
on the CONTU Report included computer programs within the definition 
of “copy.”227
For copyright purposes, then, human expression that is rendered by 
machines into a format readable only by machines remains protectable 
expression both in its human-readable and machine-only-readable form. 
This seems to extend the First Amendment principles regarding computer 
software discussed in Section III.B above. Even when there is an 
intermediate step of machine “translation,” the resulting information can 
be considered “expression,” at least for the purpose of copyright law. By 
analogy, using a password to unlock a decryption key so that a disk’s 
contents can be human-readable might represent a form of “testimonial” 
speech even though the mechanical process of “translation”—
decryption—happens within the machine.
An interesting wrinkle in the copyright discussion of computer code 
is that the early cases describing how programming works—from source 
                                                                                                                     
221. Id. at 13–14.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 10.
224. See id. at 9–10, 18 (noting that the perforated musical rolls used by player pianos are 
created via “mechanical construction,” and that such rolls cannot be read as musical 
compositions).
225. Id. at 18.
226. Id. at 20 (Holmes, J., concurring).
227. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (defining “copy” and “computer program”); Copyright Act of 
1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075, 1075–76 (1909) (extending Copyright protection to 
“mechanical reproductions” of music).
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code, to a complier, to object code—are no longer entirely accurate.228
For some kinds of coding languages, the source code is not usually 
compiled into object code, but instead is executed by an “interpreter.”229
A common example is JavaScript, which is employed on many webpages 
and is interpreted and run by web browsers.230 Also, some programming 
environments, such as Microsoft Visual Basic, enable programmers to
select and assemble pre-coded modules through a graphical user interface 
(GUI) instead of writing lines of source code.231 In these kinds of 
environments, there is perhaps an even closer link between the human-
readable and machine-readable iterations of the work.
IV. ENCRYPTION, THE SIGN, AND THE SIGNIFIED: WHY DISCLOSURE OF 
PASSWORDS OR DECRYPTION KEYS IS NOT TESTIMONIAL
These analogies from First Amendment and copyright law highlight 
the difficulty of classifying computer code in semiotic terms. In these 
domains, computer code can be a form of protected expression because it 
is a kind of language. Like any other language, computer code is viewed 
in First Amendment and copyright law through a somewhat naïve 
semiotic lens as a kind of sign that points relatively straightforwardly to 
some intelligible human signification. But the more computer code 
moves towards basic functionality, the less likely it is to be protected by 
law.
In this light, the apparent relevance of First Amendment cases, such 
as Junger and Corley, to the Fifth Amendment context dims.232 In those 
cases, the speaker of computer code is the person who writes the code.233
An end user of encryption software does not write any code. The 
password that unlocks a device using full disk encryption is not itself 
computer code, but triggers the application of computer code when the 
decryption key is applied to the encrypted data in relation to the 
encryption algorithm.  
                                                                                                                     
228. See Ed Felten, Source Code and Object Code, PRINCETON CTR. FOR INFO. TECH. POL’Y:
FREEDOM TO TINKER (Sept. 4, 2002),  https://freedom-to-tinker.com/2002/09/04/source-code-and-
object-code/.
229. Id.
230. See Overview of JavaScript, http://web.stanford.edu/class/cs98si/slides/overview.html 
(last visited Feb. 27, 2018).
231. See Margaret Rouse, Visual Basic (VB), TECHTARGET http://searchwindevelopment.
techtarget.com/definition/Visual-Basic (last visited Feb. 27, 2018); Derek Banas, Visual Basic 
Tutorial 2017, YOUTUBE (Nov. 30, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=3FkWddODLno.
232. See supra Section III.C. 
233. See, e.g., Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 436–37 (2d Cir. 2001); 
Junger v. Daley, 209 F.3d 481, 483–84 (6th Cir. 2000).
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Similarly, copyright protects only original expression, not ideas, 
processes, methods, or systems of operation.234 This makes the issue of 
infringement interesting in computer software copyright cases. By 
definition, computer programs are designed to cause computers to 
perform some function. What aspect of computer code could be 
“expression” rather than an idea, process, method, or system of 
operation? In an infringement claim involving computer software, the 
court usually will seek to define various levels of “abstraction,” from 
lines of code to structure and logic to general function, in order to filter 
out elements that are unprotectable before comparing the protectable 
elements with the allegedly infringing program.235 As may be imagined, 
this is at best an imprecise exercise.
It is unlikely that an encryption key, algorithm, or related password
could be considered protectable “expression” under any kind of 
abstraction-filtration-comparison analysis. The algorithm is a 
mathematical function, which can only be expressed in a particular way, 
and therefore is equivalent to the idea itself and is unprotectable under 
the “merger” doctrine.236 The form of the key is dictated by the function 
of the algorithm. 
Things get interesting here, because a strong encryption algorithm 
must be capable of generating very large numbers of unique keys;
otherwise, any given collection of encrypted data would be subject to 
brute force attack employing a defined set of keys. It is possible that, with 
a large number of possible variations, the merger doctrine might not 
eliminate copyright entirely. It is doubtful, however, that any person 
could be considered the “author” of a randomly generated key for 
copyright purposes.
Like the First Amendment analogy, the copyright analogy 
demonstrates the difficulty of determining what kind of communication 
inheres in computer code, and more particularly, in encryption 
algorithms, keys, and associated passwords. As with the First 
Amendment analysis, the immediate functionality of this form of 
expression suggests that it would not be legally protected under copyright 
law. The random nature of machine-generated keys further argues against 
copyrightability. There is an undefined point at which computer code is 
no longer a sign that points to something signified, similar to language or 
“speech,” but instead is a kind of “thing” in itself, similar to a tool, device,
or key. 
                                                                                                                     
234. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012).
235. See, e.g., Comput. Assoc’s Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 706 (2d Cir. 1992).
236. See, e.g., Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700, 705 (2d Cir. 1991) (stating that 
“expression is not protected in those instances where there is only one or so few ways of 
expressing an idea that protection of the expression would effectively accord protection to the 
idea itself”).
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This demonstrates that disclosure of an encryption algorithm or 
decryption key itself should not be viewed as testimonial “speech” under 
the Fifth Amendment. In semantic terms, handing over passwords and 
decryption keys is like handing over a physical key, even though speaking 
or typing a code accomplishes the act of “handing over.” If the content of 
some computer code could itself convey a message that might incriminate 
a person, the Fifth Amendment privilege should apply. But this is 
unlikely and does not apply at all to encryption algorithms or decryption 
keys. This kind of code does not convey any message. It has no semantic 
content and is entirely functional. The forced disclosure of a decryption 
key, then, should not in itself implicate the Fifth Amendment. 
But what about the forced disclosure of a biometric identifier or 
password that is tied to full disk encryption? Biometric identifiers such 
as fingerprints seem closest to the kinds of acts of production the Fisher
Court said are not testimonial, including “traditional” blood samples.237
Passwords seem different because they are “words,” or at least strings of 
characters. As with fingerprints, however, the pass-“words” or character 
strings tied to full disk encryption convey no semantic content. They are 
entirely functional. Disclosing the password is very much like the 
physical act of handing over the lockbox key; the decryption key is very 
much like the teeth on the lockbox key, which fit into the mechanical 
locking mechanism, and the encryption algorithm is very much like the 
mechanical locking mechanism on the strongbox lock.
This semantic analysis suggests that the “foregone conclusion” 
doctrine should be viewed in this context not as an “exception” to the 
Fifth Amendment privilege, but as a tool that helps clarify what kinds of 
technological acts fall on the side of “function” rather than “testimonial 
communication.” The cases that have ordered disclosure of passwords or 
encryption keys have found or assumed the action was testimonial but 
applied the foregone conclusion doctrine as an exception.238 The results 
in those cases were correct, but a more careful review of how passwords 
and biometric identifiers function in relation to encryption could 
strengthen the analysis.
In a few cases, courts have refused to apply the foregone conclusion 
doctrine to forced decryption based on the Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning 
in In re Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated March 25, 2011.239 Other courts 
should reject the Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning because, as the discussion 
of full disk encryption in Part I above demonstrates, that court made a
fundamental mistake concerning the nature of encrypted computer 
                                                                                                                     
237. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 408 (1976).
238. See supra Section II.B.
239. See, e.g., SEC v. Huang, No. 15-269, 2015 WL 5611644, at *3–4 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 23, 
2015) (relying on In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated March 25, 2011, 670 F.3d 1335 
(11th Cir. 2012) in declining to apply the foregone conclusion doctrine).
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“files.” The Eleventh Circuit panel’s failure to understand basic computer 
technology fatally undermines its legal analysis of both the non-
testimonial nature of computer encryption keys or passwords and the 
“foregone conclusion” rule. 
The Eleventh Circuit seemed to suggest that a computer “file” must 
contain semantically meaningful information—that the 0’s and 1’s must 
signify some meaningful concept.240 A “file,” however, is not a 
component of a “language.” A file is merely a kind of container, which 
may or may not hold documents encoded with some semantic meaning, 
and a computer “file” is simply any specific set of data stored on a 
computer.241 Therefore, the “random characters” placed on the hard drive 
by the TrueCrypt software were computer “files,” contrary to the court’s 
conclusion. Production of the encryption key or password would merely 
have allowed the government to decrypt those files that were more than 
random strings of characters, or at least to determine that none of the 
computer files contained meaningful information.242
The Eleventh Circuit’s misunderstanding of computer technology was
compounded by its misplaced reliance on Justice Stevens’ opinion in 
Hubbell.243 Justice Stevens’ concern in Hubbell related to the requirement 
that the defendant comb through large numbers of documents and identify 
specific documents that might respond to the subpoena, when the 
government had no prior reason to believe that the documents might exist 
or be under the defendant’s control.244 In forced decryption cases, in 
contrast, the government already knows the hard drive or other computer 
storage device exists and is under the suspect’s control; that the hard drive 
or storage device is encrypted; and that the suspect possesses the 
password or key necessary for decryption. If the underlying concern is 
that the search warrant, subpoena, or other process used to obtain the hard 
drive or storage device was overly broad, that issue properly falls under 
                                                                                                                     
240. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated March 25, 2011, 670 F.3d. at 1346. 
241. See File, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/
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the Fourth Amendment privacy domain. Disclosure of the password or 
decryption key only reveals facts about the suspect’s control over those 
functional items, not about what the encrypted storage media does or does 
not contain.
Consider the following example: a suspect in a tax fraud case admits 
that an unlocked filing cabinet in his office contains “files” that belong to 
him. The government obtains a grand jury subpoena requiring the suspect 
to turn over the file cabinet. The suspect argues that he should not be 
required to turn over the filing cabinet because this would comprise a 
testimonial admission concerning his control over the documents in the 
files. Under Fisher, this scenario clearly falls under the foregone 
conclusion exception.245
But what if the suspect argues that he should not be required to turn 
over the filing cabinet because all the files are empty—they are nothing 
but manila folders that contain no writing and no documents of any kind? 
This should utterly undermine, not support, any Fifth Amendment 
argument. If the defendant’s argument is truthful, he would be required 
to hand over some physical objects—a filing cabinet and some manila 
folders. Production of these physical items would not be considered 
testimonial under the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, and the suspect’s 
possession and control of the items would be a foregone conclusion. The 
suspect might have an objection to the subpoena based on scope, burden, 
or relevance, but these are not Fifth Amendment privileges.
Assume further that the government believes the suspect is lying about 
the folders being empty. The government believes, correctly, that the 
folders contain records relating to the alleged tax fraud. Should the 
subpoena be quashed because both the existence and content of the 
documents could be incriminating given the suspect’s lie about the file 
cabinet’s contents? This would be an obviously incorrect, indeed bizarre, 
result. In response to a subpoena to produce files, a suspect would only 
need to claim the files are “empty” to be relieved of any obligation of 
production. The foregone conclusion exception would be gutted if it 
could be avoided through a simple lie.
Imagine instead that the suspect produces the physical file cabinet, 
which is filled with manila folders containing sheets of paper covered 
with seemingly random characters. The suspect admits that he employs a 
crude encryption system that uses a cardboard “mask” with cut outs in a
pattern. When placed over the pages filled with seemingly random 
character strings, the mask will reveal only the letters intended to be read 
as part of a message. But the suspect claims that some or all of the files 
in this cabinet really contain only random characters, without any 
messages that could be revealed by the mask. In fact, this is part of the 
                                                                                                                     
245. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 407–08 (1976).
36
Florida Law Review, Vol. 70, Iss. 4 [], Art. 3
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol70/iss4/3
2018] ENCRYPTION AND THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 919
genius of his filing system, because an unwanted inquirer would need to 
expend an enormous amount of time trying to discover which, if any, of 
the files contain pages with messages. It seems clear that the foregone 
conclusion doctrine would apply under these circumstances. There is no 
doubt that the file cabinet exists, that it contains files, that the files contain 
documents that may or may not convey meaningful semantic content, and 
that all of this is under the custody and control of the suspect. Turning 
over the files is an act of production, not of testimony.
In the example that opened this string of hypotheticals, we specified 
that the suspect’s file cabinet was unlocked. If the cabinet was locked, 
should that change the analysis of any of the hypotheticals under the 
foregone conclusion exception? In addition to the cabinet itself, the 
government must obtain the physical key or lock combination (depending 
on the kind of lock) from the suspect. The issue here is not what, if 
anything, the file cabinet contains, but rather whether the suspect 
possesses or knows the key or combination. Since the suspect admitted 
that he uses the cabinet to store “files,” regardless of what those “files” 
might contain, the suspect’s possession and control of the key or 
combination is a foregone conclusion. This suggests that the Third 
Circuit’s comment in Apple Macpro Computer was apt: the relevant 
testimony would be “‘I, John Doe, [have the key or] know the 
[combination] for [this filing cabinet].’”246 Even more directly, if the 
suspect turned over the key or combination, this would comprise an act 
of surrender, not of testimony. Although both the teeth on the key and the 
characters in the combination function as types of code, neither are signs 
that signify any meaning beyond their function. The same is true of 
passwords and biometric identifiers that access decryption keys.
CONCLUSION
Encryption is an ancient technology that has become widely available 
and enormously powerful in the computer age. It is both necessary to 
contemporary life and dangerous. While encryption enables free 
commerce and free speech, it also allows criminals an uncrackable safe 
haven—a kind of digital Tortuga for online piracy.247 Courts now 
regularly must decide whether compelled disclosure of passwords or 
decryption keys violates the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination. Neither a password, nor a biometric identifier that 
activates a decryption algorithm, nor the algorithm itself, comprises 
testimonial speech. Handing over a password, biometric identifier, or 
decryption key is akin to handing over a physical key, which is not 
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ordinarily a testimonial act under the Supreme Court’s Fifth Amendment 
jurisprudence. The foregone conclusion doctrine should be employed in 
these cases not as an exception to the Fifth Amendment privilege, but to 
clarify that compelled decryption is an act of production and not a 
testimonial act. Courts that have held otherwise have not properly 
understood what encryption is or what it does.
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